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SNYDER V. PHELPS NOTE

Snyder v. Phelps: The Destruction of the Equilibrium
between the Right to Free Speech and the Right to
Protection from it
Stewart F. Berkeley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 courts
have struggled with the crucial goal of balancing First Amendment freedom of
speech rights with the “right to avoid unwelcome speech.”2 However, this fragile
balance has been heavily disrupted by the 2009 decision of Snyder v. Phelps.3 In
Snyder, the Fourth Circuit eliminated all potential avenues of recovery to victims
who are assaulted with any hateful speech that contains “hyperbolic rhetoric” or
can’t be proven false.4 Thus, a grieving family (who had just suffered the horrific
loss of a child and only wants to mourn in peace) can’t recover for emotional
distress when their funeral services are disrupted by bigoted protestors.
Instead of granting a means of protection to private citizens who were
wronged at a time of extreme vulnerability, Snyder v. Phelps instead creates an
incentive for religious speakers to be abusive, by expanding freedom of speech
protections to unprecedented levels.5 In Snyder, the Fourth Circuit wrongfully
extends Hustler Magazine v. Falwell6 by creating “something close to a
categorical privilege for statements on matters of public concern unless they are
provably false.”7 This new rule ignores any previous Supreme Court goals of
offering greater protection to “private” citizens, who unlike “public” figures, are
incapable of protecting themselves.8
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, University of Miami School of Law; B.B.A., Finance,
Marketing and Business Management and Organization, 2009, University of Miami.
1
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000).
3
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009).
4
Id. at 220.
5
See Krista Gesaman, Free (Hate) Speech, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 2010, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/16/free‐hate‐speech.html.
6
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
7
Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and Speech‐Based Tort
Liability, CARDOZO L. REV. (DE NOVO) 1, 13 (2010).
8
See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344‐45 (1974)(Ruling private
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This casenote argues that Snyder strays from precedent by abandoning all
previous Supreme Court intentions of allowing private citizens some form of
protection from outrageous speech.9 Part II will trace the evolution of First
Amendment law beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan.10 This section will
focus on how the Supreme Court intended to protect freedom of speech while
also protecting private citizens from undeserved abuse. Part III will offer a
background showing the events that led up to Snyder v. Phelps and offer a brief
factual background of the case. Part IV will analyze the Fourth Circuit court’s
decision in Snyder v. Phelps and demonstrate how it inappropriately granted
Phelps First Amendment protection against Snyder’s Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress (IIED) and Intrusion upon Seclusion claims by expanding
defamation doctrine to these unrelated torts. Furthermore, this section argues
that allowing recovery for IIED should not be barred to private citizens because it
poses little risk to 1st amendment rights.11
II. WALKING THE THIN LINE BETWEEN FREE AND HARMFUL SPEECH
Freedom of speech is one of society’s most cherished rights. But when
free speech is left unfettered, it can come at a significant cost that society can’t
afford to pay. As a result, the Supreme Court has attempted to balance the
interests between freedom of speech (especially the press) and freedom to
avoid speech.12 In the Supreme Court’s initial attempt to protect both of these
interests, the court created separate standards of proof for “public” and
“private” citizens trying to prove defamation claims.13
New York Times v. Sullivan looked to protect free speech by allowing the
press to criticize public figures that were intimately involved in all the most
pressing public questions.14 Before New York Times, the only defense to libel
was proving false statements to be true. The Supreme Court realized in New
citizens don’t have to prove “actual malice” standard because they have less access to
effective channels of communication to counteract false statements and are therefore
more vulnerable.).
9
See, e.g. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)(ruling that residents are have a right to
privacy in their homes.); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)(ruling that
patients have right to avoid unwanted speech when approaching an abortion clinic).
10
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11
See Shulman, supra note 7, at 30.
12
See id. at 10.
13
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279‐80 (1964)(Public plaintiff;
must prove ‘actual malice’‐that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
344 (1974)(private plaintiff; proving a certain level of culpability set by the states.).
14
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279‐80 (1964).
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York Times that "allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it
on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred."15 The
requirement of having to prove the impossible true even if it was true, would
lead to mass self‐censorship that would have a “chilling effect” on the industry.16
Out of this fear, the Supreme Court created a rule barring “public officials from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’‐that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.”17 This created a high bar for recovery on defamation claims requiring the
plaintiff to prove that the newspaper was actually at fault.18
Although the Supreme Court appreciated the need for an uncensored
press that wouldn’t be afraid to go head on with high ranking public figures,19
they realized that this need must be balanced with that of the private citizens
who can’t easily protect their reputations from the press.20 Accordingly, in 1974
the Supreme Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, to determine how to balance
the counteractive needs for free public debate on important social issues with
personal privacy.21 In Gertz, the majority determined that in order to protect
private citizens from the press they must not be held to as high a burden of
proof as the actual malice standard used for public officials.22 Instead, the new
standard of recovery would be based on proving a certain level of culpability set
by the states. However, to protect the press damages would be limited to actual
injury and punitive damages would be barred.23
The Supreme Court reasoned that private citizens must be protected
because they don’t have the same access to “channels of effective
communication” as public figures, and therefore it is much harder for private
individuals to counteract false statements and restore their good name.24
Furthermore, public figures and public officials enter the public arena by choice
and therefore voluntarily open themselves to the prospects of bad press,

15

Id. at 279.
Id. at 279‐80, 300.
17
Id. at 279‐80.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 300.
20
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (“The first remedy of any victim
of defamation is self‐help ... ‘Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication’ ... ‘Private individuals are
therefore more vulnerable to injury’...”).
21
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
22
Id. at 345‐46.
23
Id. at 346.
24
Id. at 344.
16
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whereas private citizens have no choice in the matter.25
Then in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,26 the Supreme Court
was posed a new question. When an issue is of no interest to the public and is a
purely private concern, should it be granted the same First Amendment
protection as speech of public concern? The Supreme Court determined that
speech of a purely private concern is of less constitutional value.27 Therefore,
defamation claims involving speech of purely private concern don’t need to meet
the “actual malice” standard to recover damages, presumed and punitive.28
After determining the appropriate level of protection to offer speech that
could be proven false, the Supreme Court shifted focus towards determining
how much to protect speech of public importance that can’t be proven false.29
In 1987, the Supreme Court confronted this issue with Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, a case determining if an offensive parody (suggesting that Reverend
Falwell’s “first time” was with his mother in an outhouse) was protected by the
First Amendment against libel and IIED claims from prominent public figures.30
The court easily disposed of the libel claim because the parody was understood
not to portray any actual facts.31 But the analysis of the IIED claim was more
interesting. Recognizing that not all speech is of equal constitutional
importance,32 the majority analyzed the history of political cartoons, such as
Nast’s famous Boss Tweed cartoon, and recognized their “prominent role in
public debate” and their need for First Amendment protection.33
Since Falwell was a “public figure”, the majority required proof of “actual
malice” to claim IIED for statements that “could not "reasonably be understood
as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he]
participated."34 The Supreme Court couldn’t allow a public figure to recover on
an “Outrageous” standard of proof because it did not meet the appropriate level
of First Amendment protection required of New York Times, and would not offer
sufficient “breathing space”.35 However, the Supreme Court never determined
whether the “actual malice” standard would be applied to IIED claims for

25

Id. at 345.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
27
Id. at 759.
28
Id. at 761.
29
See Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 49.
32
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
33
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
34
Id. at 57.
35
Id. at 56‐57.
26
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outrageous public speech directed at “private” individuals.36
In the wake of Hustler, the Supreme Court recognized the need to protect
private citizens by determining what types of non‐factual statements would
receive constitutional protection. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,37 the
Supreme Court determined that opinions were not universally protected by the
First Amendment against defamation claims, because “expressions of "opinion"
may often imply an assertion of objective fact”38 and could be equally damaging
to one’s reputation. Therefore “statements on matters of public concern must
be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law.”39
Further, the statement must seriously suggest something harmful and can’t just
be loose, figurative or hyperbolic language.40
III. ORIGIN OF SNYDER V. PHELPS
For over 15 years, the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC), led by the Phelps
family, has been promoting their bigoted message that God is punishing America
for its tolerance of homosexuality.41 However, the WBC never got much
attention until recently when they began picketing soldier’s funerals.42 The WBC
pickets soldier’s funerals because they offer wide media attention and because
“funerals are the perfect time to spread its message because they are events at
which people consider their own mortality.”43 In response to the WBC’s tactics,
over 29 state legislatures have now written ordinances to protect mourning
funeral attendees from protestors.44 Phelps has challenged some of the anti‐
picketing statutes with mixed results.45
36

See Shulman, supra note 7, at 13.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
38
Id. at 18‐19(If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he implies a
knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth ..."In my
opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement,
"Jones is a liar.").
39
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
40
Id. at 21.
41
Ashby Jones, To What Degree Does the Constitution Protect Hurtful Speech?, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/03/09/to‐what‐degree‐does‐
the‐first‐amendment‐protect‐hurtful‐speech/.
42
Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against
the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 303‐05 (2008).
43
Id. at 312.
44
Id. at 340.
45
Compare Phelps‐Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008) (First Amendment rights
outweighed state’s interest.) with McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky.
2006) (State’s interest in banning funeral picketing was legitimate but ordinance
extensive.) and Phelps‐Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008) (Funeral picketing
37
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Despite the legislation, the WBC continues to preach their hateful
message at soldier’s funerals, but now do so according to the terms of the
various state ordinances.46 On March 10th, 2006 Phelps along with members of
the WBC picketed the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder.47
The WBC protested using signs with general messages as “God Hates the USA,”
“America is doomed,” “Pope in hell,” and “Fag troops.” Along with other sign
with messages that could’ve been directed at the Snyder’s family such as “You’re
going to hell,” “God hates you,” “Semper fi fags,” and “Thank God for dead
soldiers.”48 After the funeral, the WBC published an “epic” called “The Burden of
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder” with vicious religious language directed
at the Snyder Family suggesting that that Albert Snyder and his ex‐wife “taught
Matthew to defy his creator” and “raised him for the devil”.49
Despite not noticing any of the WBC’s activities during the funeral
services, Albert Snyder still suffered severe emotional distress after viewing their
protest on TV and finding the “epic” online.50 Snyder sued the WBC for five
separate tort claims. The district court ruled in favor of Snyder on the claims for
IIED, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion and conspiracy. The district
court denied the Snyder’s defamation claim because it was religious opinion that
would not open Snyder to public scorn.51 The district court also denied Snyder’s
publicity to private life complaint because all information made public was
already published in a newspaper obituary.52
Phelps appealed to the Fourth Circuit; they reversed. In its analysis, the
Fourth Circuit determined that both Phelps’s signs and the “epic” were
constitutionally protected types of speech.53 The court came to this conclusion
by extending total tort immunity to two types of speech contained in the signs
and “epic”, statements of public concern that don’t have a provably false factual
connotation, and loosely figurative or hyperbolic language.54

statue is legitimate.).
46
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008).
47
Id. at 571.
48
Id. at 572.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572‐73 (D. Md. 2008).
52
Id. at 573.
53
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222‐26 (4th Cir. 2009).
54
Id. at 219‐20.
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IV. SNYDER HUSTLED BY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
A. Should the Court’s Two Sub‐Categories of Protected Speech be Fully
Protected from All Tort Liability?
Having to determine if Phelps’s picketing was protected speech, the court
quickly moves through the Times‐Gertz line of cases and acknowledged the
different burdens of proof for public and private individuals.55 But after a quick
reference to Gertz, the majority wrongfully abandons this train of thought for a
“distinct but related line of cases” based solely on “type” of speech.56
In exploring this new line of cases, the majority determines “There are
two subcategories of speech that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual, and that thus constitute speech that is
constitutionally protected.”57 The first category is statements of public concern
that don’t have a “provably false factual connotation’’58 and the second category
is rhetorical statements employing ‘‘loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language.’’59
However, the court’s grant of full immunity from tort liability to these two
classifications of speech seems unfounded based on the line of cases cited by the
court.
The court justifies its two sub‐categories by citing Milkovich and Hustler.
But neither of these decisions shows any basis for such an exemption. Milkovich
addresses both of the two sub‐categories created by the court, but Milkovich
was purely a defamation case with a holding limited to media defendants.60
Therefore, granting Milkovich protection to a bigoted protestor with no press
credentials was an unjustified extension of that holding.61 The majority tries to
cover up Milkovich’s deficiencies by using Hustler as justification for granting full
tort immunity to their two sub‐categories of speech.62 The court claims that
Hustler demonstrates the Supreme Court’s approval of extending First
Amendment protection to other torts than defamation.63 However, even though
Hustler did extend First Amendment protection to IIED claims, Hustler only
extended this protection to public figures, based on the rationality of New York
Times.64
55

Id. at 218.
Id. at 218.
57
Id. at 219‐20.
58
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
59
Id. at 20‐21.
60
Id. at 19‐20.
61
See Shulman, supra note 7, at 19.
62
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2009).
63
Id. at 218.
64
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
56
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The Supreme Court never ruled out extending Hustler IIED protections to
claims where the plaintiff was a private individual, but it also didn’t approve it.65
Based on the Supreme Court’s history of balancing free speech and private
interest, it seems that the Fourth Circuit’s extension of a New York Times based
decision to a private individual would diverge from precedent. It seems more
plausible to follow the lead of the district court and use a Gertz based analysis
allowing tort claims to go forward under a lesser burden of proof to be
determined by the states.66
B. Do Phelps’s Actions Fall Under either of the Sub‐Categories?
Using their two sub‐categories of constitutionally protected types of
speech, the court analyzed all of the signs and the “epic” to determine if tort
liability could attach itself to any of Phelps’s messages.67 To do this, the court
separated the signs into two groups.68 The first group contained signs with
speech of public concern including “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,”
“Fag Troops,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “God
Hates Fags.”69 The court viewed these signs as of public concern because they
addressed prominent social issues such as the Catholic Church scandal and
homosexuals in the military. The court determined that “no reasonable reader
could interpret any of these signs as asserting actual and objectively verifiable
facts about Snyder or his son.” Further, the court found that even if these signs
could be interpreted to state facts about Snyder or his son, they contained
hyperbolic rhetoric to spark debate and were therefore protected speech.70
The second group contained the signs “You’re going to hell” and “God
Hates You”.71 Given the pronoun “You”, these signs could be interpreted as
being directed at Albert Snyder and his son. However, the court determined that
even if the signs were personally targeting Albert Snyder and his son, they were
constitutionally protected from tort liability because the signs did not “assert
provable facts.”72 While the protection of the first group of signs seems
reasonable in light of the courts two sub‐categories of constitutionally protected
speech, its protection of the second group seemed outright foolish. Both of the
Fourth Circuits sub‐categories were meant to protect speech of public concern.73
65

See Shulman, supra note 7, at 13.
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008).
67
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222‐26 (4th Cir. 2009).
68
Id. at 222‐24.
69
Id. at 222.
70
Id. at 223.
71
Id. at 224.
72
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2009).
73
Id. at 219‐20.
66
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But, the signs in the second group appear to be of a purely private nature and
therefore are of less constitutional value.74
The court’s reasoning for granting protection to the “epic” was even
more troubling. The “epic” was filled with statements of a private nature,
blatantly directed at the Snyder family. Unlike the signs which used the
ambiguous pronoun “you”, the “epic” was titled ‘‘The Burden of Marine Lance
Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder’’ leaving no doubt as to the target and nature of the
speech.75 Once again, the court ignored the private nature of the speech and
incorrectly granted the “epic” protection because it contained rhetorical
hyperbole.76
C. Should the First Amendment Have Been Analyzed? (Concurrence)
The concurring opinion by Judge Shedd declined to decide the case on a
First Amendment basis, under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.77
Instead, he suggested a reversal of the lower court’s decision solely on lack of
sufficient evidence to prove either tort claim; a highly questionable decision
considering the sufficiency claim was waived by Phelps.78 As the majority points
out, the right to waive the sufficiency defense was at the defendant’s discretion
and therefore the court was required to address the First Amendment issue.79
D. Tort Remedies are Necessary to Protect Private Victims from Harmful
Speech
In denying all tort remedies to private citizens confronted with highly
offensive rhetorical speech, the court failed to adequately “balance the rights of
grieving families and the free speech rights of demonstrators, however
disturbing and provocative their message.”80 Without tort remedies, the scale is
tipped in a way that encourages protestors to become more belligerent because
they have no fear of repercussions.81 In fact, after the Fourth Circuit’s decision
the more outlandish and hurtful the message, the greater the protection.82

74

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2009).
76
Id. at 224‐25.
77
Id. at 227.
78
Id. at 216.
79
Id.
80
Bill Mears, Justices to hear case over protests at military funerals, CNN.COM (July 19,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/03/08/homosexuality.protest/index.html.
81
See Shulman, supra note 7, at 3.
82
Id.
75
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By allowing private citizens to make IIED claims against outrageous
speech, it will protect private citizens from being targeted with unwanted
outrageous messages at little cost to free speech.83 As noted by Judge Shedd,
IIED claims are extremely hard to prove and are “rarely viable.”84 “Liability has
been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”85 This
sort of standard wouldn’t harm free speech because much more than mere
offense or insult would be needed for a claim to succeed.86
V. CONCLUSION
Snyder v. Phelps was a misguided decision that expanded First
Amendment rights at great expense to private citizens. The Fourth Circuit took
Hustler in an unexpected direction by unjustifiably expanding total tort
protection to two new sub‐categories of speech diverging greatly from the
Supreme Court’s goal of balancing free speech and privacy.87 The Fourth Circuit
failed to acknowledge the long‐standing “Private”‐“Public” distinction and as a
result stripped private citizens of the only viable self‐help remedy readily
available to them, the courts.88 Allowing IIED claims would have done little harm
to First Amendment freedoms because there are high standard of proof.89 The
Supreme Court must reexamine this opinion and restore the equilibrium
between free speech and privacy.

83

See Brief for the State of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009)( No. 09‐751).
84
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 231 (4th Cir. 2009).
85
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965).
86
See Brief for the State of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009)( No. 09‐751).
87
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219‐20 (4th Cir. 2009).
88
See Chelsea Brown, Not Your Mother's Remedy: A Civil Action Response to the
Westboro Baptist Church's Military Funeral Demonstrations, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 232
(2009).
89
See Brief for the State of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009)( No. 09‐751).

